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accordance with its own ideological preferences And my criticism on this 
point concerns both Democrats and Republicans
For example, in the Carter administration, the goal of promoting human 
rights oftentimes was used as an element of our overall foreign policy to 
oppose or undercut so-called authoritarian regimes of the right By 
contrast, during the Reagan administration, the goal of protecting human 
rights has been used almost exclusively to attack so-called totalitarian 
regimes of the left During both administrations, the cause of human 
rights was invoked as a justification for the purpose of promoting a 
definite political agenda, the protection of human rights was not simply 
viewed as a desirable objective m  its own right To be sure, however, on 
this account the abuses of the Reagan administration have been far in 
excess of and magnitudinally different from any of those committed by the 
Carter administration
So long as the United States government refuses to ratify these major 
treaties, the cause of human rights will be used and abused by whatever 
administration is in power to oppose, attack, condemn, destabilize, etc 
those governments and regimes abroad with which it disagrees primarily for 
political reasons The cause of human rights will continue to be 
exploited as a means to another end and not treated as an end in itself 
within the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy This 
politicization of human rights by whatever government is m  power will 
continue to detract from, if not undermine and destroy the credibility of 
U S human rights foreign policy both at home and abroad
If the United States government is genuinely committed to the 
promotion of human rights at all times and in all places and with respect 
to all governments around the world, its human rights foreign policy must
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ltself This is not to say that m  the meantime the United States 
government should not pursue the goal of promoting human rights around the 
world But rather, to point out that this goal cannot be accomplished in 
an effective manner until we first ratify these treaties, open ourselves 
up to similar criticism, and thus remove the hypocrisy that has so far 
permeated our international position on human rights
In response to this criticism, some opponents to the ratification of 
these treaties have argued that the United States government s> internal 
legal system for the protection and promotion of human rights is so far 
superior to that found in most other states of the world that no point 
would be served by allowing our human rights record to be attacked by 
totalitarian or authoritarian states m  the Second or Third World The 
proper response to that criticism is quite simple and forthright If our 
internal system for the protection of human rights is so perfect, then we 
have absolutely nothing to fear from foreign criticism especially if it 
emanates from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes whose internal defects 
are so patently obvious to all members of the international community as 
well as to the American people
The international protection of human rights is not a zero-sum game 
If there are deficiencies m  our internal system for the promotion of 
human rights, then consistent with American values, we should certainly be 
willing to correct them And that axiom should hold true for no matter 
which state is offering the criticism Just because the Soviet Union 
might be deaf to the criticisms of the international community when it 
comes to perpetrating violations of basic human rights upon its own 
citizens provides absolutely no good reason why the United States should 
react to foreign criticism in the same obtuse manner After all, America
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same sources of opposition to the abolition of racial discrimination 
against Black Americans m  the United States It is these same bastions 
of racism which are today continuing to fight a rear-guard operation 
against the attainment of complete and effective racial equality for all 
segments of American society by means of opposing the ratification of 
these basic international human rights treaties
We have all heard the argument advanced before, and we continue to 
hear the argument propounded today, by conservative Southern Senators such 
as the late Sam Ervin, Jr or Jesse Helms, inter alia that the 
ratification of these human rights treaties would somehow violate states 
rights and therefore would be unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution The latter provides that all powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people The gist of these opponents argument was and still is that the 
ratification of these international human rights instruments would 
infringe upon a state s supposedly traditional right to regulate the 
normal day-to-day affairs of its own citizens By implication, 
presumably, this would include the right of state governments to permit 
discrimination against Black Americans
The so-called cause of states rights was used to impede the 
institution of formal racial equality in the United States of America from 
the seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court m  Brown v The 
Board of Education, 347 U S 483 (1954) until the adoption of the major 
pieces of civil rights legislation m  the mid-1960 s States rights was 
always the battle cry of those who opposed the institution of racial 
equality m  this country by means of the adoption of legislation by the
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ìnternatuonai agreement on matters affecting the foreign affairs of the 
United States of America
Some two decades after Missouri v Holland, the United States 
government sponsored the foundation of the United Nations Organization 
during the course of the Second World War The Charter of the United 
Nations was a treaty that received the advice and consent of two-thirds of 
the membership of the United States Senate For that reason the United 
Nations Charter was and still is entitled to claim the benefits of the 
so-called Supremacy Clause found in the United States Constitution 
Article 6 thereof provides in relevant part that all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall be 
the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding In other words, in the event of a conflict between a 
United States treaty and a state law or constitution, the provisions of 
the treaty must prevail Needless to say, the revolutionary implications 
of the Supremacy Clause when applied to the Charter of the United Nations 
were quite clear to both the proponents and opponents of eliminating all 
forms of racial discrimination against Blacks in the United States of 
America
For example, the Preamble to the United Nations Charter states that 
the peoples of the United Nations are determined to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, m  
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small 
Likewise Charter article 1(3) states that one of the purposes of the 
Organization is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex
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ïnvoking the Supremacy Clause m  U S federal courts on the ground that 
these promoted genocide7 And m  particular, later on, would it not be 
true for any multilateral international agreement entered into by the 
federal government for the promotion and protection of human rights that 
it could be used to strike down racially discriminatory legislation and 
practices by the states of the Union by invoking the Supremacy Clause in a 
federal court7 In essence, how could the proponents of states rights 
continue to maintain their system of racial discrimination against Blacks 
on a state-by-state basis in America when the federal government was 
concluding international human rights treaties and agreements that could 
require the states to abolish these various forms of racially 
discriminatory laws and practices7
This issue was joined squarely in the by—now celebrated case of Sei 
Fujii y California, 217 P 2d 481 (1950), decided by the California 
District Court of Appeal In that case a Japanese national who was 
ineligible to become a United States citizen under the U S naturalization 
laws then in existence sued for a determination of whether or not an 
escheat of land he bought had occurred under the provisions of the 
California Alien Land Law which prohibited aliens ineligible to become 
citizens from acquiring real property m  the state of California The 
plaintiff relied upon the human rights provisions found m  the United 
Nations Charter, specifically its Preamble and articles 1, 55, and 56 He
argued that under the terms of the Supremacy Clause, these provisions of a 
United States treaty must take precedence over the discriminatory state 
law The District Court of Appeal agreed with his argument and held that 
the Alien Land Law was unenforceable because it violated both the letter 
and the spirit of the United Nations Charter
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state legislation and practices by means of the Supremacy Clause on the 
grounds that they promoted genocide The same principle would hold true 
for any other international human rights treaty that the federal 
government might conclude on behalf of the United States of America 
Thus, while the defenders of racial discrimination were fighting a 
heated battle on the domestic front to oppose and impede Congress s 
adoption of civil rights legislation, the executive branch of the federal 
government could be concluding international treaties or agreements that 
might accomplish the exact same result So the defenders of racial 
discrimination had to broaden their attack m  order to prevent the 
executive branch of the federal government from concluding any 
international human rights treaties that could possibly be used in a 
manner that would undercut so-called states rights for the purpose of 
continuing to discriminate against Black Americans From a constitutional 
perspective, the way they sought to do this proved to be most insidious 
and quite effective
In order to accomplish this objective, they turned to Senator Bncker, 
who at that time represented the state of Ohio, where the Ku Klux Klan was 
quite active and powerful Senator Bncker introduced what came to be 
known as the Bncker Amendment to the United States Constitution, S J 
Res 1 & 43, 83d Cong , 1st Sess (1953) The proposed Bncker Amendment 
attempted to solve the problem created by the ratification of 
international human rights treaties by the federal government in a manner 
favorable to the advocates of states rights for the purpose of 
continuing to allow states to practice or permit racial discrimination 
against Blacks There were six sections to the proposed Bncker 
Amendment two of which are relevant to the analysis presented here
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The real heart of the Bncker Amendment, however was found in section 
A which provided that all executive or other agreements between the 
President and any international organization foreign power or official 
thereof shall be made only in the manner and to the extent to be 
prescribed by law and that such agreements shall be subject to the 
limitations imposed on treaties or the making of treaties by this 
article It was section A of the Bncker Amendment that constituted the 
heart of the threat to the executive branch of the federal government in 
order to coerce the cessation of ita support for the negotiation, 
conclusion, and signature of fundamental human rights treaties on behalf 
of the United States of America
This was because the vast majority of international agreements entered 
into by the United States government with other governments, international 
organizations, or foreign officials never receive the advice and consent 
of two-thirds of the Senate Rather, they are entered into by means of 
executive agreements concluded by the President or his delegated authority 
on behalf of the United States of America With respect to some issue 
areas, these agreements require prior congressional authorization or 
subsequent congressional approval, with respect to other subjects the 
President is free to enter into these agreements under his own independent 
powers m  accordance with the terms of the Constitut_on^or powers that 
have already been delegated to him by Congress Section A of the Bncker 
Amendment would have made it almost impossible for the executive branch of 
the federal government to conduct any form of business with other foreign 
states without some form of express approval bv Congress Such a 
requirement would have literally brought the conduct of foreign affairs by 
the United States government to an abrupt halt and the proponents of the
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these four covenants have yet to receive the advice and consent of the 
Senate Moreover when it transmitted these four treaties to the Senate 
for consideration the Carter administration recommended that the Senate 
adopt a declaration along the lines of section 3 of the Bncker Amendment 
to the effect that these four covenants cannot become binding as internal 
law in the United States without the enactment of appropriate implementing 
legislation by the Congress Such an exemption of these four covenants 
from the benefits of the Supremacy Clause would gut a great deal of their 
meaning and effectiveness m  the event that the United States Senate 
eventually does give its advice and consent to them
Superficially it appeared that the Reagan administration was 
successful m  finally convincing the Senate to give its advice and consent 
to the 19^8 Cenocide Convention Quite frankly, it is shocking and 
inexcusable that the Lnited States gc/ernment bas not yet become a party 
to this pathbreak^ng treaty tha*- represented the first of the post-World 
War II covenants designed pr_ma»-ily to protec international human 
rights Even then, today s deFende”s of states rights and racial 
discriminât ion successfully fought a rear-guard action to amend the treaty 
m  a var ety of ways that flv m  v.he face of uhe fact that the 
International Court of Justice has already held in an Advisory Opm^or 
that amendments or reservations to the te^ms of the Genocide Convention 
were fundamentally inconsistent with its purpose and therefore invalid 
When the U S Senate finally gave its advice and consent to the 
Genocide Convention on February 19 1986 by a vote of 83 to 11, it
attached two reservations five understandings and one declaration I 
will not bother analyzing these in any detail here Suffice it to say 
that the one declaration provided that the President cannot deposit the
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Angeles and Philadelphia, among others would vigorously contest the 
validity of this latter proposition
But even if the Inited States government were to someday ratify the 
Genocide Convention without the two reservations, five understandings 
and one declaration attached by the Senate, this act would not open up to 
judicial or political scrutiny and adjudication the monstrous crimes of 
the past thah have been undeniably perpetrated against Black Americans 
with the active participation or tacit acquiescence of our state or 
federal governments This would be pursuant to the doctrine of customary 
international law enunciated m  article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties to the effect that unless specifically provided 
otherwise a treaty does not bind a partv m  relation to any act or fact 
which took- place or any Situation whxch ceased to exist before the date of 
the entry into force of the treaty w_th resoecu to that party 
Nevertheless the serious problem cheated by the policies our federal and 
state governments currently pursue toward indigenous peoples m  this 
country would still need to be examined m  light of the letter and spirit 
of the Genocide Convent on and any other international human rights 
treaties we might ra fy If thei,e international human rights treat.es 
can somehow be used to improve the deplorable and lamentable condition of 
American Indians and Eskimos, all U S citizens will be better off for the 
success of such an endeavor Yet today there are some Americans located 
m  certain regions of this country who opposed the ratification or the 
Genocide Convention for that very reason
Hence, we see a direct cont.ruitv between those who or.gi',a.lv opoosed 
racial non-discrimination and equal rights and liberties for all Americans 
in the name of states rights and those who are still opposing the U S
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house by ratifying these major international human rights trea íes and 
eliminating the last vestiges of racial discrimination in America today 
against Blacks Indians Eskimos and other minority groups "ha we can 
then have any right or standing under international law to preach tc other 
countries how they should treat their own citizens Until that day comes 
the rank hypocrisy and racism behind the formulation of L S human rights 
foreign policy will continue to mock and undercut whatever good-^aith 
efforts we might matee to promote and protect human ngh s around the worM
